The Ambiguity of "Determinism"

"Essentially, there are at least three different versions of ‘determinism’, as briefly described below.

(1)    Predictability Determinism. Determinism is sometimes defined as the epistemological doctrine that ‘any event can be rationally predicted, with any desired degree of precision, if we are given a sufficiently precise description of past events, together with all the laws of nature’ (Popper, 1982, pp. 1-2).

(2)    Regularity Determinism. A different definition of determinism is the notion that, any given set of circumstances and state of the world must lead to a unique outcome: ‘given A, B must occur’ (Blanshard, 1958, p. 20). Regularity determinism involves a denial of randomness and chance in the universe. This is an ontological rather than an epistemological notion: it says nothing about what we may be able to know or predict.

(3)    The Principle of Determinacy. Another definition of determinism is the notion that every event has a cause (Urmston, 1989). This is again an ontological statement about the world, otherwise known in philosophy as ‘the principle of universal causation’ or ‘ubiquity determinism’. As Mario Bunge (1959, p. 26) put it, the ‘principle of determinacy’ means: ‘Everything is determined in accordance with laws by something else’.

These crucial differences require that the ambiguous word ‘determinism’ be defined whenever it is used. The principle of determinacy is central to Darwinism and is adopted here.  But the other two versions are rejected. There is nothing in Darwinism that involves any commitment to the first two versions of determinism. Furthermore, these three versions of determinism are logically independent: one does not flow from another. Predictability determinism – the dream of Laplace – is itself countered by the realization of analytical and computational limits in the face of complexity, and even of the limits of mathematics itself (Gödel’s Proof), and more recently by theories of computability, chaos and complexity. There are non-linear systems with such a high degree of sensitivity to initial conditions that no amount of accurate measurement of the appropriate parameter values can provide a sufficiently accurate prediction (the Butterfly Effect). Predictability in the human domain is also confounded by the logical problem of predicting future knowledge or creativity. If prediction led us to know future knowledge, then it would be present knowledge, not knowledge confined to the future (Popper, 1960, 1982).

The principle of determinacy does not mean that the future is inevitable, at least in the sense of unavoidable. As Dennett (2003) pointed out, knowledge of causal determination enhances rather than diminishes the possibility of avoiding an outcome. Determinacy does not mean inevitability.

Even if determination is not statistical but links one set of causes with one set of effects, then there are still objections to regularity determinism. Roy Bhaskar (1975) rightly rejected regularity determinism on the grounds that it would work only if it were confined to a closed system, and most systems are in fact open. The possibility of exogenous disturbances undermines regularity determinism in specific systems.

Would regularity determinism apply to the universe as a whole? Given that the universe is interconnected and systems are open, the regularity ‘given A, B must occur’ could not be specified unless A corresponded to a complete description of all the possible influences on B, from throughout the universe. In practice, the statement ‘given A, B must occur’ will itself be indescribable in its massive scope and complexity. Strictly, with unlimited interconnectedness, the ‘given A, B must occur’ statement will only pertain if A is a complete description of the state of the universe. The idea of regularity determinism cannot apply to any limited description of the world, and complete descriptions are unattainable. Consequently, even if regularity determinism applied to the universe as a whole, it would offer little epistemological guidance for science.

Having rejected or disabled the first two versions of determinism, the (third) principle of determinacy is retained. Indeed, it is a necessary foundation for science. A theological definition of a miracle is something that happens without a scientifically explicable cause. If science admits the possibility of an event without a cause, then it has abandoned its own mission. We can retain a broad view of the nature of science, but the quest for meaning and explanation is indispensable to any version of the scientific enterprise. Of course, we cannot prove the unfeasibility of an uncaused cause. In general, proofs of causality, or of its absence, are impossible. But science is nevertheless obliged to search for causal explanations, and determinacy must thus be assumed. In many circumstances, prediction will be impossible. Nevertheless, the quest for some kind of causal explanation must remain. To behold a first and uncaused cause is to issue licence at that point to abandon the quest.

Darwinism is thus incompatible with the idea of George Shackle (1976) that human intentionality is an ‘uncaused cause’. A problem with Shackle’s position is that it involves an investigatory closure. Once we affirm an ‘uncaused cause’ we say that science should explain this much, but no more. We may move so far down the causal chain, but no further. We arrive at a causal and explanatory roadblock, policed by the adherents of the ‘uncaused cause’. Admittedly, all ontological commitments involve dogma in the sense that they cannot be directly verified by experience. But the principle of determinacy is preferable to the ‘uncaused cause’ in that it does not place dogmatic bounds on the scope of scientific enquiry and explanation. The preferable ontological commitment is one that rules out miracles and denies any no-go zones for science. The roadblock must be opened, even if the road ahead is treacherous and complex. [12]

How can a first and ‘uncaused cause’ be compatible with the recognition that other outcomes are caused? How is this special causal void to be explained? Is it ubiquitous to nature, or does it lurk merely in a mammalian neural system? Or is it unique to humans? How can evolution explain its sudden appearance?

The uncaused cause is sometimes defended as the requirement of real choice. If our choices are determined, how could we have acted otherwise? Choice may be seen to lack substance if there was no alternative. But crucially, two situations of choice are never identical in all details. Even if two situations are very similar, we could act differently because of slight influences with sufficiently magnified effects. For instance, the very fact that we are reflecting upon the possibility of ‘acting otherwise’ may be sufficient for us to make a different choice. A multiplicity of conflicting causal influences acts upon our decisions, with complex feedbacks and interactions. In some cases, our own deliberations can have big effects. Complexity, emergence and sensitivity can make choice real, despite the fact that it is determined.

Dewey (1894, pp. 338-9) notably responded to the proposition of an uncaused ego with the insistence that ‘it becomes necessary to find a cause for this preference of one alternative over the other.’ He continued: ‘when I am told that freedom consists in the ability of an independent ego to choose between alternatives, and that the reference to the ego meets the scientific demand with reference to the principle of causation, I feel as if I were being gratuitously fooled with.’ For Dewey, in full Darwinian spirit, the need for causal explanation could not be abandoned.

Some authors argue that if our will is determined then we can hardly be held responsible for our choices and our actions. It is alleged that as a result of such ‘determinism’ there can be no basis for morality or law. Two brief responses are appropriate here. First, if our will is determined, then moral pressure and legal sanctions still can have an effect on our actions. Consequently, there is no ground for abandoning morality or law. Second, even if, on the contrary, our will was an ‘uncaused cause’, then we would be no more responsible for the capricious and spontaneous processes that led to our actions. The ‘uncaused cause’ adds nothing extra to the importance of morality or law. They are important in any case.

For example, a philosophically minded murderer might claim that his decision to pull the trigger of his gun was caused by events beyond his control. Another might claim that her intention to murder appeared spontaneously (or uncaused) in her mind. The first murderer is just as responsible for the murder as the second. In both cases the prosecution would argue that the (caused or uncaused) inclination to kill should have been resisted by the murderer, so that the murder did not take place. The principle of determinacy does not diminish the burden of individual responsibility. [13]

The position adopted here does not rule out some notions of novelty, nor even of ‘free will’. A number of philosophers – including the Greek scholastics, David Hume and Jean-Paul Sartre – have argued that an idea of free will is compatible with the principle of determinacy. In philosophy, this position is known as ‘compatibilism’. It upholds that even if our choices are determined then that does not rule out the reality of the process of choice. It is beyond the scope of this work to establish the possibility of compatibilism. I simply note that the Darwinian position stated here admits ground for the ‘compatibilist’ argument that ‘choice’ and ‘free will’ can be reconciled with the proposition that every event is determined. The human will is a real cause, but it is a proximate rather than an ultimate cause (Mayr, 1982). [14]

If novelty simply refers to unpredicted outcomes then we have no difficulty admitting such possibilities, even if every event is caused. We now know from chaos theory that even if every event is determined, the world is still often unpredictable. Randomness and apparent indeterminacy remain. Novelty may be caused, but it will often appear as entirely spontaneous and free. Prior causes always exist, but the complexity of the system may make them especially difficult to identify. In open, complex, non-linear systems all sorts of novelties are possible. What are ruled out of the picture are novel effects that do not themselves obey actual scientific laws. [15]"

[12] My own position has changed on this issue. Hodgson (1993) failed to decisively reject the notion of an uncaused cause. However, I also noted that chaos theory suggests that even if the world is deterministic, it may appear as entirely spontaneous and free. I now believe that the admission of the possibility of an uncaused cause is not only unnecessary but also untenable, for the reasons given here.

[13] For a discussion of related ethical themes, in the context of Darwinism, see J. Richards (2000).

[14] On compatibilism see Sterba and Kourany (1981), Dennett (1984), Honderich (1993) and Vromen (2001).

[15] On the compatibility of novelty with the principle of determinacy see Bunge (1959, ch, 8). Vromen (2001) rightly argues that evolutionary theory cannot be rejected on the grounds that it fails to predict novelty. If novelty involves unpredictability then it is unpredictable by any theory.

Bhaskar, Roy (1975) A Realist Theory of Science, 1st edn. (Leeds: Leeds Books).

Blanshard, Brand (1958) ‘The Case for Determinism’ in Hook, Sidney (ed.) (1958) Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science (New York and London: Collier Macmillan), pp. 19-30.

Bunge, Mario A. (1959) Causality: The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Dennett, Daniel C. (1984) Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

Dennett, Daniel C. (2003) Freedom Evolves (London: Allen Lane).

Dewey, John (1894) ‘The Ego as Cause’, Philosophical Review, 3(3), May, pp. 337-41.

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (1993) Economics and Evolution: Bringing Life Back Into Economics (Cambridge, UK and Ann Arbor, MI: Polity Press and University of Michigan Press).

Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2004) The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism (London and New York: Routledge).

Honderich, Ted (1993) How Free Are You? (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Mayr, Ernst (1982) The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).

Popper, Karl R. (1960) The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).

Popper, Karl R. (1982) The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism, from the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery, ed. William W. Bartley, III (London: Hutchinson).

Richards, Janet Radcliffe (2000) Human Nature After Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction (London and New York: Routledge).

Shackle, George L. S. (1976) ‘Time and Choice’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 66, pp. 309-29. Reprinted in Shackle, George L. S. (1990) Time, Expectations and Uncertainty in Economics: Selected Essays of G. L. S. Shackle, ed. J. L. Ford (Aldershot: Edward Elgar).

Sterba, James P. and Kourany, Janet A. (1981) ‘How to Complete the Compatibilist Account of Free Action’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 41(4), June, pp. 508-23.

Urmston, J. O. (1989) ‘Determinism’, in Urmston, J. O. and Rée, Jonathan (eds) (1989) The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 78.

Vromen, Jack J. (2001) ‘The Human Agent in Evolutionary Economics’, in Laurent, John and Nightingale, John (eds) (2001) Darwinism and Evolutionary Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 184-208.